I  S6"7 


PAM. 

M13C. 


F.  P.  A. 

Pamphlet  No.  35 
Series  of  1925-26 


The  Significance 

OF 

Locarno 


'Discussed  by 

Mlle.  Louise  Weiss 

Mr.  James  G.  McDonald 

AND 

Dr.  Paul  Leverkuehn 


Miss  Christina  Merriman,  (Chairman 


8  it/  Luncheon  Discussion 

HOTEL  ASTOR,  NEW  YORK 
NOVEMBER  21,  1925 

of  the 

Foreign  Policy  Association 

NATIONAL  HEADQUARTERS 

NINE  EAST  FORTY-FIFTH  STREET 

NEW  YORK 


SPEAKERS: 

MLLE.  LOUISE  WEISS 

Editor,  V  Euro  pc  Nouvclle  (Paris)  ;  Chevalier  of  the  Legion  of  Honor 


MR.  JAMES  G.  MCDONALD 

Chairman,  Executive  Board,  Foreign  Policy  Association 


DR.  PAUL  LEVERKUEHN 

Of  the  staff  of  the  German-American  Mixed  Claims  Commission 


MISS  CHRISTINA  MERRIMAN,  Chairman 


GUEST  TABLE 


Mr.  Brent  Dow  Allinson 
Mr.  James  B.  Alley 
Mr.  Donald  Brodie 
Mile.  Baudains 
Mrs.  Linzee  Blagden 
Dr.  Wendell  T.  Bush 
Hon.  Charles  R.  Crane 
Mr.  Keith  Hutchinson 
Mr.  H.  V.  Kaltenborn 

Dr. 


Mr.  Albert  Lieberfeld 
Mr.  Maurice  Mercadier 
Dr.  Parker  T.  Moon 
Mr.  Bernard  Naumberg 
Mr.  George  W.  Ochs-Oakes 
Mr.  Chester  Rowell 
Mr.  and  Mrs.  Andre  Siegfried 
Mr.  Jesse  I.  Straus 
Dr.  Mary  Evelyn  Townsend 
Ernest  Jackh 


THE  SIGNIFICANCE  OF  LOCARNO 


Miss  CHRISTINA  MERRIMAN,  Chairman 

THE  TREATIES  concluded  at  Locarno  were  the  culmination  —  a 
regional  and  partial  solution,  if  you  prefer — of  the  post-war  dis¬ 
cussion  of  European  security ;  and  I  shall  try  to  sketch  very  briefly  in¬ 
deed  some  of  the  major  European  attempts  to  solve  this  problem  of 
security  and  its  twin  sister,  disarmament,  in  the  seven  years  leading  down 
to  Locarno. 

The  first  attempt,  you  will  remember,  was  when  the  French  delegates 
to  the  Paris  Peace  Conference  made  three  demands :  ( 1 )  That  the  west¬ 
ern  frontiers  of  Germany  be  fixed  at  the  Rhine;  (2)  that  the  Rhine 
frontiers  be  occupied  permanently  by  an  inter- Allied  force  under  the 
League  of  Nations;  and  (3)  that  one  or  more  independent  states  be 
created  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine. 

Moreover,  the  French  members  of  the  Commission  drafting  the  Cove¬ 
nant  of  the  League  of  Nations  proposed  to  make  of  the  League  a  strong 
defensive  alliance  with  an  international  army  and  an  international  general 
staff. 

We  remember  also  that  these  attempts  failed,  and  because  of  this  fail¬ 
ure  France  has  never  considered  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  alone  an  ade¬ 
quate  guarantee  of  security. 

In  order  to  reassure  France,  the  Tripartite  Pact  was  then  put  forward 
in  1919  by  President  Wilson  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George.  It  proposed  that 
Britain  and  the  United  States  should  jointly  assist  France  in  case  of 
unprovoked  aggression  on  the  part  of  Germany.  But  it  was  not  put 
through,  as  you  know,  because  our  Senate  failed  to  ratify  it. 

The  Treaty  of  Versailles  itself  provided  for  the  permanent  demili¬ 
tarization  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  and  certain  zones  on  the  right 
hank,  also  for  drastic  reduction  and  limitation  of  German  armament 
under  the  supervision  of  the  Inter-Allied  Commission  of  Control.  More¬ 
over,  the  Allies  were  to  occupy  the  Rhine  bridgeheads  for  fifteen  years, 
the  occupation  to  be  partially  withdrawn  over  five  and  ten  year  periods 
— final  evacuation  to  be  contingent  upon  Germany’s  fulfilment  of  her  obli¬ 
gations  under  the  Treaty.  And  Great  Britain  attributed  her  refusal  to 
evacuate  Cologne  on  January  10  last,  as  provided  in  the  Treaty,  to  the 
report  of  the  Inter-Allied  Commission  of  Control  that  Germany  had  failed 
to  carry  out  all  the  disarmament  provisions  of  the  Treaty. 

Before  this,  however,  France  had  sought  security  in  other  directions, 
and  had  entered  into  a  military  convention  with  Belgium  and  into  treaties 
of  alliance  with  Poland  and  with  Czechoslovakia.  With  the  friendly 
cognizance  of  France  there  was  formed  also  the  so-called  Little  Entente, 


3 


which  binds  together  by  treaty  Czechoslovakia,  Roumania,  and  Jugo¬ 
slavia.  i  Umrn 

Meanwhile,  the  idea  of  an  Anglo-French  alliance  had  never  been  wholly 
abandoned.  In  1922,  you  will  remember,  Lloyd  George  proposed  to 
Briand  at  Cannes  a  treaty  similar  to  the  defunct  Tripartite  Treaty  of 
1919.  Under  this  new  treaty  proposal,  Britain  engaged  to  come  to  the 
aid  of  France  in  the  case  of  ‘‘unprovoked  aggression  against  the  soil  of 
France”  by  Germany.  But  this  was  doomed  to  failure,  as  was  the  sub¬ 
stitute  draft  later  proposed  by  Briand’s  successor,  M.  Poincare.  For  the 
French  felt  they  must  have  a  guarantee  which  would  cover  also  the  eastern 
frontiers  of  Germany,  and  to  this  Great  Britain  would  not  assent. 

Parallel  with  these  efforts,  covering  three  years,  the  League  of  Nations 
was  attempting  to  carry  out  Article  VIII  of  the  Covenant,  which  enjoins 
the  Council  to  formulate  plans  for  the  “reduction  of  national  armaments 
to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with  national  safety  and  the  enforcement 
by  common  action  of  international  obligations.”  The  1922  Assembly  of 
the  League  was  the  first  to  endorse  the  conclusion  arrived  at  after  months 
of  study  by  the  disarmament  commissions  of  the  League  that  disarmament 
and  security  were  indissolubly  linked. 

In  the  1923  Assembly,  the  Draft  Treaty  of  Mutual  Assistance,  some¬ 
times  called  the  Cecil-Requin  Treaty,  which  embodied  a  rather  intricate 
system  of  sanctions  and  made  provision  for  defensive  alliances,  was  re¬ 
ferred  by  the  Assembly  to  the  states  members  of  the  League.  It  was 
not,  however,  approved  by  the  requisite  number  of  governments. 

Its  successor,  the  justly  famous  Geneva  Protocol  of  the  1924  Assem¬ 
bly,  was  conceived  in  an  uprush  of  liberalism  in  which  the  Labor  Govern¬ 
ment  of  Great  Britain  and  the  Herriot  Government  of  France  vied  with 
each  other  in  a  will  to  peace  that  brought  forth  the  definition  of  an 
aggressor  as  that  nation  which  refused  to  go  to  court  to  arbitrate  its 
differences.  The  Protocol,  they  tell  us,  is  dead — rejected  by  the  Con¬ 
servative  Government  of  Britain.  But  we  may  live  to  see  the  day  when 
that  vital  definition  of  an  aggressor  will  become  the  cornerstone  of  a  new 
Protocol,  or  series  of  Protocols,  which  shall  gain  the  adherence  of  all 
civilized  nations. 

Nevertheless,  we  must  note  now  that  the  Protocol  failed  of  adoption, 
and  we  must  turn  back  for  a  moment  to  1922  for  the  direct  forerunner 
of  the  Locarno  Treaties. 

In  December,  1922,  Chancellor  Cuno  of  Germany  proposed  that  France, 
Germany,  Great  Britain  and  Italy  “engage  themselves  towards  one  another 
and  promise  the  United  States”  not  to  go  to  war  for  at  least  a  genera¬ 
tion,  say  thirty  years,  unless  war  was  decided  upon  by  popular  vote,  which 
Cuno  declared  would  make  war  virtually  impossible.  You  will  remember 
that  the  Allies  were  then  involved  in  a  dispute  with  Germany  over  repara¬ 
tion  payments.  Cuno’s  proposal  was  flatly  rejected,  and  characterized 
by  Poincare  as  a  “clumsy  maneuver”  on  the  eve  of  a  new  conference  on 
reparations. 

A  month  later,  in  January,  1923,  France  occupied  the  Ruhr,  and 
Franco-German  relations  became  so  strained  that  German  overtures  toward 
European  security  went  temporarily  into  the  discard. 

4 


But  in  February  of  this  year  Germany  again  brought  forward  her  pro¬ 
posals,  re-written,  expanded,  and  much  more  definite.  After  several  ex¬ 
changes  of  notes,  these  proposals  were  accepted  as  a  basis  for  discussion; 
and  that  brings  us  down  to  the  Locarno  Conference  and  the  resulting 
treaties.  And  here  I  will  turn  the  meeting  over  to  the  proper  authorities, 
who  will  tell  you  what  happened  at  Locarno  and  what  is  to  come  of  it  all. 


IT  IS  a  very  great  pleasure  for  me  to  introduce  the  first  speaker  of  the 
afternoon.  She  has  been  so  helpful  and  so  gracious  to  officers  of  the 
Foreign  Policy  Association  on  recent  visits  to  Paris  that  we  are  repaying 
her  by  asking  her  to  condense  into  twenty  minutes  an  account  of  what 
has  happened  in  Europe  in  the  last  seven  years,  which  made  the  Locarno 
Conference  possible. 

There  are  few  people,  I  think,  in  Europe  that  have  had  a  better  op¬ 
portunity  than  she  has  had  to  get  this  information  at  first  hand.  I  think 
I  talked  to  no  one  in  France  who  was  better  informed  than  she.  She  is 
a  friend  of  M.  Herriot — in  fact,  she  tells  me  she  had  a  letter  from  him 
today.  The  financial  editor  of  her  magazine  is  the  Minister  of  the  Budget 
in  the  new  French  Cabinet.  The  Paris  correspondent  of  the  New  York 
Evening  Post  referred  to  her,  upon  her  arrival  here,  as  the  most  famous 
woman  in  France,  if  not  in  Europe,  and  the  French  Government  has  re¬ 
cently  made  her  a  Chevalier  of  the  Legion  of  Honor.  It  is  an  honor, 
therefore,  as  well  as  a  pleasure,  to  introduce  Mile.  Louise  Weiss,  Editor  of 
V Europe  Nouvelle  of  Paris.  [Applause.] 


Mlle.  LOUISE  WEISS 

WHEN  my  dear  friends  of  the  Foreign  Policy  Association,  Miss 
Christina  Merriman  and  Mr.  James  G.  McDonald,  whose  work  I 
had  admired  in  Paris  and  in  Geneva,  asked  me  to  speak  this  after¬ 
noon,  I  not  only  thought  that  it  would  be  a  pleasure  and  an  honor  to 
address  a  fine  audience  of  citizens  of  Manhattan,  the  City  of  Towers, 
but  I  really  felt  that  I  had  something  to  say  on  Locarno,  not  only  as  a 
Frenchwoman  devoted  to  her  own  country,  but  also  as  a  citizen  of 
Europe  devoted  to  the  welfare  of  the  old  continent.  A  citizen  of  Europe 
indeed  I  feel. 

I  very  heartily  thank  you  for  having  come.  If  I  were  you  I  would 
not  have  come,  I  would  have  left  for  Boston  to  see  the  Harvard-Yale 
football  game  [laughter]  ;  and  if  you  had  not  come  here  today  I  would, 
myself,  have  gone  to  the  game.  [Laughter.]  So  that  though  James 
McDonald  is  a  fine  fellow  and  Christina  Merriman  really  works  hard  for 
peace  with  knowledge  and  hope,  it  would  have  meant  the  end  of  the 
Foreign  Policy  Association  luncheon  for  me. 

Imagine  if  I  were  to  declare  here  very  strongly  that  I  hope  the 
Harvard  boys  were  going  to  defeat  the  Yale  men.  [Applause.]  Half 
of  this  audience  would  immediately  interrupt  and  shout  and  feel  very 
strongly  that  they  would  rather  have  the  Yale  men  win.  [Applause.] 
Imagine  further  some  authority  thinking  that  a  partisanship  for  Yale 
or  Harvard  was  working  against  the  progress  of  education  in  America. 
Imagine  that  this  authority  forbade  the  press  to  write  about  the  game, 
and  would  not  allow  the  names  of  the  boys  of  the  teams  to  be  printed 

5 


in  the  papers,  that  this  authority  would  fight  the  excitement  going  on. 
I,  being  already  100  per  cent.  American,  would  think  this  man  very  un¬ 
popular,  and,  knowing  nothing  about  America,  laugh  at  him,  scorn  him, 
and  vote  and  have  my  friends  vote  against  him. 

However,  the  men  in  Locarno  were  strong  enough  to  take  this  atti¬ 
tude  toward  national  excitement,  to  master  the  press  in  their  own  re¬ 
spective  countries,  to  fight  with  success  the  partisanships  for  their 
national  teams,  and,  what  is  more,  to  make  us  hate  the  idea  of  begin¬ 
ning  any  of  our  contests  again  somewhere  down  the  Rhine  frontiers 
or  in  the  Balkans,  or  even  further  east,  in  Silesia  or  the  Carpathian 
Mountains.  Indeed,  they  were  good  men,  they  were  strong  men,  and 
they  had  a  very  difficult  task. 

I  must  warn  you  that  I  am  full  of  prejudice;  having  worked  very 
hard  in  Europe  for  the  Locarno  agreements,  I  am  not  going  to  criticize 
them  here.  What  I  shall  try  to  do  is  to  point  out  to  you  what  events 
in  my  eyes  made  possible  such  agreements  for  peace. 

I  understand  that  the  next  speaker  is  going  to  tell  you  the  contents 
of  the  Locarno  agreements  with  preciseness.  I  will  only,  for  my  part, 
state  this:  if  those  agreements  are  finally  ratified,  they  will  have  brought 
to  France  a  feeling  of  security  which  she  has  not  had  since  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles.  I  hope  that  they  will  bring  to  Germany  the  feeling  that 
the  way  of  international  arbitration  is  open  to  her  for  the  regulation  of 
her  own  difficulties  and  that  she  would  henceforth  be  treated  on  an 
equal  footing  with  the  other  powers  in  the  councils  in  which  the  fate 
of  the  world  is  decided.  They  have  given  assurance  of  viability  and 
stability  to  Czechoslovakia  and  Poland.  Italy  agreed.  And  England, 
conscious  of  her  rights  and  of  her  duties  as  a  European  power,  has 
guaranteed  the  integrity  of  the  Rhine  frontier,  thus  making  this  complex 
ensemble  of  agreements  possible  and  efficacious. 

But  Locarno  is  only  one  of  the  aspects  of  the  big  changes  which 
have  taken  place  in  Europe  since  the  Armistice.  My  hope  is  to  make 
clear  to  you  today  in  a  few  words  what  those  big  changes  have  been — 
how  they  work  or  will  work  in  connection  with  the  Locarno  agreements. 
Thus  you  will  see  the  social,  the  economic,  in  one  word,  the  human 
background  of  the  Locarno  agreements,  and  also  the  hopes  and  the  diffi¬ 
culties  that  we  Europeans  foresee  in  the  near  future. 

The  first  of  those  big  changes  I  should  like  to  emphasize  is  the 
agrarian  reform,  which  since  1917  has  transformed  the  face  of  Central 
and  Eastern  Europe  from  Vienna  to  the  Ural  Mountains  and  from  Danzig 
to  Constantinople.  These  agrarian  reforms  in  countries  like  Russia  are 
now  complete.  They  are  about  ready  to  go  through  in  other  countries, 
thus  bringing  into  political  life  masses  who,  until  now,  had  no  voice 
or  but  a  small  voice  in  the  government  of  their  respective  countries.  This 
is  a  very  important  fact.  Millions  of  peasants  have  become  small  owners 
looking  out  for  the  preservation  of  their  property  and  are  now  hostile 
to  any  military  venture.  These  gradual  reforms  have  destroyed  all  of 
the  remnants  of  the  feudal  system  which  still  existed  in  Europe,  and 
have  wiped  away  the  traditions  of  feudalism  of  which  war  was  not  the 
least.  1  hese  reforms  also  have  socially  stabilized  immense  countries, 
huge  areas,  and  have  brought  men  into  power  who  were,  until  now, 

6 


unconscious  of  the  political  part  they  could  play.  They  have  given  to 
those  masses  the  task  of  becoming  politically  educated  so  as  to  pre¬ 
serve  and  defend  their  little  property.  So  that  these  reforms  have 
given  support,  conscious  or  unconscious,  to  the  Treaties  of  Locarno,  of 
millions  of  men  who  have  fields  about  their  huts  and  an  alphabet  in 
their  heads,  when  formerly  they  had  nothing — nothing  indeed.  I  saw 
them  in  their  huts  and  in  their  poor  little  houses  over  in  Central  and 
Eastern  Europe.  They  had  nothing  except  their  religion  and  their  hope 
of  issuing  from  their  wretchedness  into  a  future  world.  Those  masses 
support  new  democratic  governments,  of  which  perhaps  the  government 
of  President  Mazaryk  in  Czechoslovakia  is  the  best  symbol;  and  this 
support  is  used  to  urge  ideas  of  peace  in  Europe.  [Applause.] 

The  second  point  I  would  like  to  make  clear  to  this  audience  as  re¬ 
gards  the  changes  which  have  taken  place  in  Europe  since  1918  is  the 
collapse  of  the  middle  class,  the  sufferings  of  the  intelligentsia  in  all 
the  countries  where  the  national  money  fell  and  lost  its  value.  The  old 
people  with  pensions,  the  crippled  and  wounded,  all  the  employees  with 
fixed  salaries,  the  professors  in  the  countries  where  the  money  sank,  had 
very,  very  hard  days,  and  some  of  them  died  because  they  had  nothing 
to  eat.  I  was  in  Germany  when  she  underwent  this  terrible  national 
catastrophe  of  the  collapse  of  the  money,  and  I  must  say  that  the  pro¬ 
fessors  and  the  leaders  of  the  young  generation  suffered  tremendously 
and  that  I  could  not  pity  them  enough.  They  lost  their  savings,  their 
means  of  work;  they  couldn’t  buy  books.  I  cannot  tell  you  the  emotion 
1  had  when  some  of  my  friends  over  the  border  of  the  Rhine  said  that 
they  had  to  spend  their  strength  in  long  trips  in  the  fields  to  try  to  find 
some  potatoes  instead  of  training  the  younger  generation  to  new  inter¬ 
national  ideas. 

I  cannot  tell  you  either  how  much  I  am  worried  and  concerned  about 
the  fate  of  my  own  country.  We  are  now  facing  the  same  problems, 
and  our  professors,  all  of  the  leaders,  the  fine  brains  which  have  the  task 
of  training  our  young  French  generation,  are  suffering  more  than  I  can 
describe.  Please  understand  the  tragic  problem  of  our  best  men,  of  our 
internationally  famous  scholars,  the  tragic  problem  of  our  universities. 

However,  in  connection  with  Locarno,  this  collapse  of  the  middle 
classes  worked  along  a  double  line.  First,  in  France  at  all  events,  and  I 
think  in  other  countries,  the  intelligentsia  looks  now  toward  Geneva  and 
the  steps  for  peace  made  possible  through  the  League  of  Nations  as  the 
way  out.  They  are  going  to  train  the  younger  generations,  and  if  you 
had  been  in  Europe  and  in  Geneva  for  years  as  I  have  been  you  would 
see  the  crowds,  every  year  more  important,  of  younger  minds  now  devoted 
to  the  ideas  that  made  Locarno  possible. 

Secondly,  the  collapse  of  the  middle  classes  brought  face  to  face  em¬ 
ployers  and  employees,  breaking  the  thousand  links  between  the  employers 
and  the  middle  classes  and  between  the  middle  classes  and  the  labor  party. 
Labor  problems  and  difficulties  about  wages,  production  and  all  eco¬ 
nomic  problems  are  bigger  now  than  they  have  ever  been  in  those 
countries,  and  they  have  to  be  dealt  with  very  carefully.  In  this  respect 
Locarno  is  also  an  element  of  social  peace.  If  the  men  in  charge  of  the 
European  governments  could  not  prove  that  they  are  doing  their  very 

7 


best  for  peace  they  would  not  be  supported  by  the  people.  Thus  the  peas¬ 
ants,  the  intellectual  classes,  the  labor  classes,  consciously  or  not,  are 
supporting  the  policies  of  their  respective  countries  which  lead  to  Locarno. 
The  democratic  governments,  half  leading,  half  following,  rush  or  totter 
to  Locarno,  but  there  they  are.  The  best  elements  of  toiling  and  still 
bleeding  Europe  are  behind  the  men  of  Locarno.  [Applause.] 

But  a  third  point  must  be  stated.  There  is  also  a  kind  of  orientation 
in  Europe  leading  to  higher  and  higher  tariffs  between  the  states.  After 
the  war  every  nation  felt  impatient  as  regards  political  independence. 
Every  one  of  them  felt  like  this:  “Well,  let  us  shut  our  borders  and 
become  very  rich.”  I  think  there  is  something  of  this  feeling  in  America. 

|  Laughter.] 

I  should  like  to  take  for  an  example  the  industries  along  the  Rhine 
border.  There  was  the  French  pre-war  industry,  the  German  pre-war 
industry,  the  French  war  industry,  and  the  German  war  industry.  Then, 
as  Alsace-Lorraine  came  back  to  France  and  Germany  built  other  plants 
to  make  up  for  or  replace  those  lacking  industries,  five  industries  had  to 
be  dealt  with  by  governments  instead  of  two.  This  brings  us  to  a  dead¬ 
lock,  and  if  we  don’t  deal  with  economic  realities  as  we  have  dealt  with 
political  ones  1  believe  that  the  political  agreements  will  not  work  in  the 
future,  because,  after  all,  shaking  hands  across  walls  of  tariffs,  across 
skyscrapers  of  tariffs — that  is  a  very  dangerous  position.  [Laughter  and 
applause.  ] 

So  we  have  to  consider  now,  we  Europeans,  an  economic  Locarno 
without  which  the  political  one  would  lose  its  meaning  in  the  future,  but — 
and  this  is  my  fourth  and  last  point — there  is  Geneva.  Geneva,  for  us 
Europeans,  is  a  town  that  we  now  have  learned  to  cherish.  I  am  not — 
not  yet — an  American  expert  on  foreign  affairs  and  I  speak  only  for 
Europe ;  but  speaking  for  Europe  I  must  hail  and  greet  the  men  in  Geneva 
for  the  splendid  work  they  have  been  doing  for  us.  Geneva  is  a  method 
and  Geneva  is  a  hope — a  method  because  there  we  have  a  crowd  of  young 
people  knowing  how  to  deal  with  the  press,  with  the  men,  with  the  meet¬ 
ings  and  how  to  carry  international  steps  for  peace  further ;  it  is  a  hope 
because  we  know  that  there  is  somewhere  in  Europe  a  crowd  of  people 
who  have  nothing  to  do  but  to  bring  about  better  conditions  on  our  devas¬ 
tated  continent.  France  is  behind  Locarno. 

After  having  left  America  I  know  that  I  shall  dream  of  a  Europe 
somewhat  resembling  the  United  States,  where  certain  large  districts  of 
Central  Europe,  with  their  minorities,  would  only  mean  for  us  in  Paris 
something  like  Idaho  would  for  you.  I  shall  dream  of  a  Europe  worthy 
and  satisfied  with  some  kind  of  a  silent  President  [laughter]  living  in 
a  federal  capital,  and  only  breaking  his  wise  silence  to  state  that  Europe 
is  now  rich  and  intends  to  be  kind  to  America.  [Applause  and  laughter.] 

That  is  our  dream  and  I  know  that  American  audiences  can  only 
approve  of  such  a  dream.  [Applause.] 

Our  Chairman,  Miss  Christina  Merriman,  pushes  my  elbow.  That 
means,  “Stop  now  with  your  European  everlasting  talk!”  If  she  knew 
what  I  have  to  say  to  finish  my  little  address  she  would  not  feel  that  way. 
1  want  to  state,  from  the  point  of  view  of  Europe,  what  beautiful  work 

8 


she  and  Mr.  McDonald  and  the  staff  of  the  Foreign  Policy  Association 
have  done.  [Laughter  and  applause.]  They  have  brought  the  spirit  of 
America  to  Europe.  Through  them  we  have  understood  the  finest  things 
_  ca  could  bring  to  us,  and  also  they  have  given  a  chance  to 

European  speakers  to  explain  themselves  and  their  countries  to  America. 
It  is  a  great  service  they  have  pledged  to  the  cause  of  better  understanding 
between  nations,  and  it  means  peace. 

I  heaitily  thank  them  and  thank  their  American  audiences.  [Applause.] 


1  he  Chairman  :  I  shan’t  attempt  to  introduce  the  next  speaker.  It 
is  too  difficult.  If  I  were  to  praise  his  power  of  keen  analysis  and  concise 
observation — I  hope  it  will  be  concise  this  afternoon — it  would  seem  to  be 
praising  the  Foreign  Policy  Association,  and  that  would  not  be  fitting. 
We  have  had  our  due  meed  of  praise  this  afternoon,  I  am  sure.  I  will 
only  tell  you  that  he  has  recently  spent  two  and  a  half  months  in  Europe 
when  he  was  very  badly  needed  at  home. 

By  mutual  agreement  he  is  to  have  his  twenty  minutes  extended  by 
some  seven  or  eight  minutes  because  he  is  going  to  analyze  and  summarize 
the  Treaties  of  Locarno.  But  I  will  venture  to  remind  our  habitual  Chair¬ 
man  that  he  has  established  a  tradition  for  keeping  speakers  within  their 
time  at  these  meetings,  which  will  be  enforced  sternly,  if  necessary,  by 
the  usurping  Chairman.  Mr.  McDonald.  [Applause.] 


Mr.  JAMES  G.  McDONALD* 

I  ALWAYS  KNEW  that  the  women  members  of  the  Foreign  Policy 
Association  staff  could  run  the  Association  and  do  all  of  the  important 
things.  I  didn’t  know  until  today  that  they  could  also  perform  the 
public  functions  at  the  luncheons,  so  I  have  the  happy  thought  that  if 
anything  happens  to  me  in  the  immediate  future  it  will  make  not  the 
least  difference  at  all.  [Laughter.] 

Now  about  this  Harvard  and  Yale  matter  [laughter]  which  Made¬ 
moiselle  Weiss  speaks  about.  It  may  be  true  that  the  Yale  people  would 
like  to  go  to  that  meeting  today,  but,  having  had  some  years  of  association 
with  Harvard  and  remembering  a  story  which  I  heard  in  Cambridge  two 
weeks  ago,  I  am  not  at  all  sure  that  I  would  have  cared  to  go.  It  was 
the  day  of  the  William  and  Mary  game.  I  was  told  by  one  of  the  fellows 
at  Harvard  College  that  he  had  just  heard  a  rumor  on  the  stock  exchange 
to  the  effect  that  Harvard  might  win  the  game  that  particular  week  if 
William  didn’t  come.  [Laughter.] 

Mademoiselle  Weiss,  from  a  tolerant  and  broadly  liberal  French  view¬ 
point,  has  surveyed  brilliantly  many  of  the  sources  from  which  the  first 
real  peace  conference  since  the  Armistice  grew.  Dr.  Leverkuehn  will 
later  give  his  interpretation  from  the  German  viewpoint  of  the  results  of 
Locarno.  Mv  task,  supplementary  to  these  two  presentations,  is  two-fold: 
( 1 )  the  difficult  and  ungrateful  job  of  summarizing  clearly  and  without 

*  p?e  PO’.'tfon  of  Mr.  McDonald's  statement  dealing  with  the  summaries  of  the  Treaties 
is  amplified  in  the  printed  form  below  in  order  to  allow  a  more  detailed  analysis  of  the 
Treaties. 


9 


insufferable  dullness  the  chief  provisions  of  the  agreements  initialed  in 
that  lovely  Italian-Swiss  village  a  few  weeks  ago,  and  (2)  the  much  easier 
task,  but  one  which  I  fear  will  be  less  worth  while,  of  giving  my  own 
interpretation  of  these  significant  treaties. 

Summary  of  the  Treaties 

The  written  agreements  of  Locarno  were  nine:  a  general  preamble, 
seven  treaties,  and  a  letter. 

The  preamble,  called  technically  “The  Final  Protocol,”  was  signed  by 
all  of  the  countries  represented — Germany,  Belgium,  France,  Great  Britain, 
Italy,  Poland,  and  Czechoslovakia.  In  it  the  signatories  declare  their 
intention  to  establish  through  common  accord  the  “means  for  preserving 
their  respective  nations  from  the  scourge  of  war  and  for  providing  for 
the  peaceful  settlement  of  disputes  of  every  nature  which  might  eventually 
arise  between  them.”  They  pledge  themselves  to  co-operate  sincerely  in 
the  efforts  already  undertaken  by  the  League  of  Nations  looking  towards 
disarmament  and  in  seeking  its  realization  through  a  general  entente. 

The  seven  treaties  may  logically  be  divided  into  three  classes: 

The  first  and  most  far  reaching  of  all  of  these  I  am  christening 
the  Treaty  of  Security  and  Mutual  Guarantee  (the  Rhineland  Pact)  ; 
it  was  signed  by  Germany,  Belgium,  France,  Great  Britain,  and  Italy.  Its 
chief  provisions  are: 

1.  Individually  and  collectively,  all  of  the  signatories  guarantee  the 
maintenance  of  (a)  the  present  boundaries  in  the  west,  and  (b)  the 
inviolability  of  the  demilitarized  zone  as  defined  in  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles. 

2.  France  and  Belgium  on  the  one  hand,  and  Germany  on  the  other, 
agree  never  to  attack  each  other  or  invade  the  territory  of  the  other,  and 
never  in  any  case  to  go  to  war  with  each  other,  except  (a)  in  the  exer¬ 
cise  of  the  right  of  legitimate  defense,  or  (b)  in  application  of  Article  XVI 
of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  (the  “Sanctions”  Article),  or 
(c)  in  case  of  an  action  taken  at  the  request  of  or  as  a  result  of  a  de¬ 
cision  of  the  Council  or  the  Assembly  of  the  League  of  Nations,  or 
against  an  aggressor  in  pursuance  of  Article  XV,  paragraph  7,  of  the 
Covenant  (permitting  States  to  use  their  own  discretion  after  the  Council 
has  failed  to  reach  a  unanimous  decision). 

3.  Germany  and  Belgium,  and  Germany  and  France,  pledge  themselves 
to  settle  by  peaceful  means  all  questions,  whatever  they  may  be,  which 
may  arise  between  them  and  which  they  have  been  unable  to  settle  by 
the  ordinary  diplomatic  channels,  in  the  following  manner : 

» 

(a)  All  justiciable  questions  shall  be  submitted  to  judicial  settle¬ 
ment,  and  the  parties  concerned  pledge  themselves  in  advance 
to  accept  the  decisions  rendered. 

(b)  All  other  questions  are  to  be  submitted  to  a  Commission  of 
Conciliation,  or  failing  settlement  through  it,  to  the  Council 
of  the  League  of  Nations  under  Article  XV  of  the  Covenant. 

10 


4.  If  one  of  the  parties  believes  that  the  Treaty  has  been  or  is  being 
violated,  it  will  submit  the  question  immediately  to  the  Council  of  the 
League  of  Nations.  If  the  Council  decides  that  there  has  been  a  viola¬ 
tion,  it  will  without  delay  notify  all  of  the  signatories  to  the  Treaty,  and 
each  of  them  pledges  itself  to  go  immediately  to  the  aid  of  the  State 
attacked. 

In  case  of  flagrant  violation  of  the  Treaty,  each  of  the  signatories 
pledges  itself  to  go  immediately  to  the  assistance  of  the  party  attacked, 
without  waiting  for  any  action  by  the  Council,  if  they  are  satisfied  that 
the  aggression  is  unprovoked  and  calls  for  immediate  action.  None  the 
less,  in  this  case  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  before  which  the 
question  has  been  brought  will  announce  its  decision,  and  the  parties  to 
the  Treaty  pledge  themselves  in  this  case  to  act  in  accordance  with  such 
recommendation  if  reached  by  unanimous  vote  not  including  the  vote  of 
the  representatives  of  the  parties  engaged  in  hostilities. 

If  either  France,  Belgium,  or  Germany  refuses  to  carry  out  an 
arbitral  or  judicial  award  or  to  “submit  a  dispute  to  peaceful  settlement,” 
and  violates  the  demilitarized  zone  or  resorts  to  war,  the  sanctions 
described  above  come  into  play. 

In  the  case  where,  without  committing  an  act  of  war  or  violating 
the  demilitarized  zone,  France,  Belgium  or  Germany  refuses  to  accept 
a  peaceful  method  of  settlement  or  to  carry  out  an  arbitral  or  judicial 
decision,  the  other  party  to  the  dispute  will  refer  the  question  to  the 
Council  of  the  League  of  Nations,  which  will  propose  action  to  be  taken. 
The  signatory  powers  agree  to  carry  out  such  decision. 

5.  The  provisions  of  the  Treaty  do  not  modify  the  rights  or  obliga¬ 
tions  of  the  signatories  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles,  nor  do  they  modify 
the  rights  and  duties  of  the  members  of  the  League  to  take  proper  meas¬ 
ures  to  safeguard  effectively  the  peace  of  the  world. 

6.  The  Treaty  is  to  be  registered  with  the  League  of  Nations,  and 
is  to  remain  in  force  until  twelve  months  after  the  decision  of  the  Council, 
by  a  two-thirds  vote,  that  the  League  gives  to  the  signatory  parties  suffi¬ 
cient  guarantees  of  security. 

7.  The  Treaty  imposes  no  obligations  on  any  of  the  British  Do¬ 
minions  or  on  India  unless  the  Government  of  such  Dominion  or  India 
signifies  its  acceptance  of  the  Treaty’s  obligations. 

8.  The  Treaty,  even  when  signed  and  ratified,  does  not  go  into  effect 
until  Germany  has  become  a  member  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

The  second  class  of  treaties  includes  four  arbitration  treaties  between 
Germany  and  France,  Germany  and  Belgium,  Germany  and  Poland,  and 
Germany  and  Czechoslovakia.  These  treaties,  identical  in  all  respects 
except  for  one  additional  article  in  the  treaties  with  Poland  and  Czecho¬ 
slovakia  to  make  them  conform  to  one  of  the  provisions  in  the  Rhine¬ 
land  Pact,  may  be  summarized  as  follows : 

1.  All  justiciable  questions  which  may  arise  between  the  signatory 
parties  and  which  cannot  be  settled  by  the  ordinary  diplomatic  procedure 
will  be  submitted  for  settlement  either  to  an  arbitral  tribunal  or  to  the 


11 


Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice.  This  sweeping  commitment 
is  weakened  (just  how  much  it  is  difficult  to  say)  by  the  following  quali¬ 
fication,  which  is  easy  to  translate  but  whose  meaning  is  far  from  clear: 

“This  provision  does  not  apply  to  disputes  arising  out  of  events  prior 
to  the  present  Convention  and  belonging  to  the  past.”* 

Before  referring  a  dispute  to  arbitral  procedure  or  to  the  Permanent 
Court  of  International  Justice,  the  parties  may,  by  mutual  consent,  sub¬ 
mit  it  to  the  Permanent  Commission  of  Conciliation,  provided  for  in 
each  treaty. 

Failing  agreement  before  the  Permanent  Commission  of  Conciliation, 
a  justiciable  question  is  to  be  referred  by  means  of  a  special  agreement 
(par  voie  de  compromis)  either  to  the  Permanent  Court  of  International 
Justice  or  to  an  arbitral  tribunal  under  the  conditions  laid  down  in  the 
Hague  Convention  of  1907.  A  very  important  step  in  advance  is  the 
additional  provision  that  in  default  of  agreement  between  the  parties  on 
the  terms  of  the  compromis,  one  or  the  other  of  them  may  bring  the  dis¬ 
pute  directly  before  the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice  by 
means  of  an  application. 

2.  All  non-justiciable  questions  which  cannot  be  settled  by  diplo¬ 
matic  means  will  be  submitted  to  the  Permanent  Commission  of  Concili¬ 
ation,  which  will  be  charged  with  suggesting  to  the  parties  an  acceptable 
solution,  and  in  every  case  with  presenting  a  report. 

If  within  a  month  after  the  ending  of  the  labors  of  the  Permanent 
Commission  of  Conciliation  the  two  parties  are  not  in  agreement,  the 
question  shall,  at  the  request  of  one  of  the  parties,  be  brought  before  the 
Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  under  the  terms  of  Article  XV  of  the 
Covenant. 

3.  In  every  case,  and  particularly  if  the  dispute  which  divides  the 
parties  is  the  result  of  action  already  taken  by  one  of  the  parties  or 
of  an  action  about  to  be  taken,  the  Commission  of  Conciliation  or  the 
arbitral  tribunal  or  the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice,  in 
conformity  with  Article  XLI  of  its  statute,  or  the  Council  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  will  lay  down  in  the  shortest  possible  time  whatever  pro¬ 
visional  measures  should  be  taken;  the  signatory  powers  agree  to  accept 
these  suggestions  and  to  abstain  from  every  action  which  might  prejudice 
a  peaceful  settlement. 

These  four  treaties,  even  when  signed  and  ratified,  do  not  come 
into  effect  until  the  Rhineland  Pact  also  becomes  effective,  that  is,  until 
Germany  enters  the  League  of  Nations. 

The  third  class  contains  the  two  guarantee  treaties  between  France 
and  Poland,  and  France  and  Czechoslovakia.  These  are,  in  effect, 
France’s  guarantee,  always  within  the  provisions  of  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  to  give  her  eastern  allies  immediate  assistance  in 
the  event  of  unprovoked  aggression  against  them  by  Germany.  Like  the 
four  arbitration  treaties,  these  two  guarantee  conventions  do  not  come  into 
effect  until  the  Rhineland  Pact  has  also  become  effective,  that  is,  until 
Germany  enters  the  League  of  Nations. 

*  Cette  disposition  ne  s’applique  pas  aux  contestations  n6es  de  faits  qui  sont  ant&rieurs  4 
la  presente  convention  et  qui  appartiennent  au  pass&. 

12 


The  chief  provisions  of  these  treaties  are  illustrated  by  the  following: 

1.  In  case  Poland  or  France  (or  Czechoslovakia  or  France)  should 
suffer  from  a  breach  of  the  obligations  entered  into  between  them 
and  Germany  for  the  purpose  of  maintaining  the  general  peace, 
France  and  reciprocally  Poland  (or  Czechoslovakia),  acting  in  accord¬ 
ance  with  Article  XVI  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations,  pledge 
themselves  to  go  immediately  to  each  other’s  aid  and  assistance,  if  the 
breach  of  obligations  is  accompanied  by  an  unprovoked  recourse  to  arms. 

2.  In  the  case  where  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations,  acting 
on  a  question  brought  before  it  under  the  terms  of  these  (Locarno)  ob¬ 
ligations,  has  not  been  able  to  draw  up  a  report  acceptable  to  all  of  its 
members  other  than  those  parties  to  the  dispute,  and  where  France  or 
Poland  (or  Czechoslovakia)  should  he  the  subject  of  an  unprovoked 
attack,  France  or  reciprocally  Poland  (or  Czechoslovakia),  acting  in 
conformity  with  Article  XV,  paragraph  7,  of  the  Covenant,  will  imme¬ 
diately  lend  each  other  aid  and  assistance. 

3.  Nothing  in  the  present  treaty  shall  affect  the  rights  and  obliga¬ 
tions  of  the  high  contracting  parties  as  members  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
or  be  interpreted  as  restricting  the  duty  of  the  League  to  take  measures 
appropriate  to  safeguard  effectively  the  peace  of  the  world. 

The  ninth  document  is  the  draft  of  a  letter  to  be  sent,  after  the  sign¬ 
ing  of  the  treaties,  to  the  German  delegation.  It  is  to  be  signed  by  the 
representatives  of  Belgium,  France,  Great  Britain,  Italy,  Czechoslovakia, 
and  Poland.  The  substance  of  this  communication  is  intended  to  satisfy 
Germany’s  doubts  as  to  Article  XVI  of  the  League  of  Nations  Covenant. 
Disclaiming  any  right  to  speak  for  the  League  of  Nations,  the  signatories 
to  the  letter  write : 

.  .  .  the  obligations  resulting  from  the  said  Article  on  the  members  of  the 
League  must  be  understood  to  mean  that  each  State  member  of  the  League 
is  bound  to  co-operate  loyally  and  effectively  in  support  of  the  Covenant 
and  in  resistance  to  any  act  of  aggression  to  an  extent  which  is  compatible 
witb  its  military  situation  and  takes  its  geographical  position  into  account. 

These  nine  documents — I  do  not  here  enter  into  the  informal  and 
unofficial  promises  which  are  said  to  have  been  made  to  Germany  but 
which  were  not  a  part  of  the  official  record* — the  Final  Protocol,  the 
Treaty  of  Security,  the  four  Arbitration  Treaties,  the  two  French  Guar¬ 
antee  Conventions,  and  the  Allies’  letter  to  Germany,  all  are  parts  of  a 
single  unified  peace  program.  None  become  effective  until  Germany  enters 
the  League  of  Nations,  with  full  rights  and  full  responsibilities.  All  of 
them  supplement  the  provisions  of  the  Covenant  but  do  not  supplant  it.  In 
short,  they  are  all  closely  integrated  with  the  League  of  Nations  peace 
system. 

*  These  were:  (a)  The  prompt  evacuation  of  Cologne. 

(b)  The  sof  ening  of  the  Rhineland  occupation  and  perhaps  the  completion 

of  its  evacuation  before  the  fifteen-year  period  stipulated  in  the  Treaty 

of  Versailles. 

(c)  The  fixing  of  an  earlier  d'ate  than  1S35  for  the  plebiscite  in  the  Saar, 

provided  for  in  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 

(d)  The  lessening  of  the  restrictions  on  German  aerial  development. 

(e)  Substitution  of  League  for  Allied  supervision  of  German  armament. 

(f)  Possibly  some  suggestion  as  to  the  return  of  one  of  the  former  German 

colonies  under  a  League  mandate. 

(a),  (b)  and  (e)  have  already  been  publicly  forecast. 

13 


Question  of  Ratification 

But  none  of  these  treaties  are  yet  ratified.*  Indeed,  only  the  protocol 
has  been  signed.  The  seven  treaties  and  the  letter  have  been  merely 
initialled.  Their  formal  signature  is  set  for  December  1.  At  no  time 
has  there  been  any  doubt  as  to  the  Allies’  signature  and  ratification ;  the 
only  doubt  has  been  as  to  Germany’s  attitude.  Dr.  Leverkuehn  will  dis¬ 
cuss  this  aspect  of  the  problem  with  vastly  greater  knowledge  and  author¬ 
ity  than  could  I.  I  am  going,  however,  in  reference  to  it,  to  venture 
one  guess  and  to  offer  one  apology.  My  guess  is  that  Germany  will  both 
sign  and  ratify.  My  apology  is  to  President  Plindenburg,  who  as  much, 
if  not  more,  than  any  other  man  will  have  made  German  ratification 
possible. 

Prior  to  the  German  election,  I,  like  many  other  students  of  European 
politics,  wrote  that  the  election  of  Hindenburg  would  be  a  blow  at  re¬ 
publicanism  in  Germany  and  a  danger  to  the  peace  of  Europe.  I  was 
exactly  one  hundred  per  cent  wrong.  President  Hindenburg  has  been 
scrupulously  punctilious  in  following  the  advice  of  his  constitutional  ad¬ 
visers  ;  he  has  materially  strengthened  the  Republic ;  he  has  discredited 
the  extreme  nationalists  and  militarists;  and  strengthened  the  peace 
forces  throughout  his  country.  If  now  Germany  enters  the  League  under 
his  Presidency  it  will  be  an  action  as  irrevocable  and  momentous  as  if 
we  were  to  enter  the  League  under  the  Presidency  of  Senator  Borah. 


I NTERPRETATION 

But  assuming  ratification  to  be  assured,  what  estimate  may  we  fairly 
make  of  the  significance  of  the  treaties?  They  seem  to  me  to  mean 
that  Europe  is  setting  her  house  in  order.  They  constitute  the  second 
great  bridge  (the  Dawes  Plan  being  the  first)  across  the  yawning  chasm 
of  hatred  and  bitterness  and  suspicion  which  the  war  created  and  which 
the  peace,  in  some  respects,  intensified.  They  are  Europe’s  answer  to  the 
challenge  that  she  should  live  at  peace  with  herself. 

Why  may  we  reasonably  expect  such  decisive  results  from  these  agree¬ 
ments  ? 

First,  because  they  are  merely  the  concrete  embodiment  of  the  present- 
day  dominant  opinion  on  both  sides  of  the  Rhine,  F  ranee  and  Germany 
are  in  a  settling  mood;  the  Locarno  pacts  express  the  prevailing  con¬ 
viction  that  the  status  quo  should  be  accepted  and  maintained.  Germans 
and  Frenchmen  do  not  love  each  other  yet,  but  they  have  come  to  see 
that  the  old  game  is  up,  that  the  period  of  ultimata  and  invasion,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  passive  resistance  and  sabotage  on  the  other,  has  been 
played  out.  Germany  and  France  are  prepared  to  live  at  peace  with 
each  other  on  the  basis  of  the  status  quo.  As  between  Germany  and 
Poland  there  is  a  much  more  difficult  question.  Though  no  German  will 
admit  that  the  Polish  boundaries  are  right,  the  dominant  German  opinion 
is  that  it  is  better  to  leave  them  as  they  are  and  hope  for  peaceful  ad¬ 
judication  later,  than  to  go  to  war.  Therefore,  Germany  pledges  her¬ 
self  in  these  eastern  treaties  never  to  go  to  war  to  change  those  fron- 

*  As  of  November  21.  At  the  time  of  going  to  press,  December  1,  1925,  the  British  Par¬ 
liament  and  the  German  Reichstag  had  ratified  the  Treaties. 

14 


tiers.  All  of  the  treaties  are  based,  therefore,  on  the  solid  foundation 
of  recognized  self-interest  and  admitted  national  necessity. 

Second,  the  treaties  are  not  the  brilliant  inspirations  of  any  one  man 
or  any  group  of  men;  on  the  contrary,  they  are  the  results  of  the  painful 
and  laborious  efforts  of  the  last  seven  years.  They  are  the  logical  de¬ 
velopment  of  previous  attempts  to  supplement  the  Covenant  and  thus 
give  a  greater  degree  of  security  in  middle  Europe.  They  borrow  from 
and  improve  on : 

(a)  The  Treaty  of  Mutual  Guarantee  of  1923 — the  Cecil-Requin 
Treaty — which  was  in  turn  the  result  of  previous  years  of  work  of  the 
League  commissions.  But,  unlike  the  effort  of  1923,  these  treaties  of  this 
year  do  not  try  to  give  France  security  by  a  union  against  Germany :  now 
Germany  is  brought  into  the  agreements ;  they  become  bi-lateral.  They 
protect  Germany  against  France  as  well  as  France  against  Germany. 

(b)  Some  of  the  ingenuous  provisions  for  permanent  commissions 
of  inquiry  are  borrowed  from  post-war  arbitration  treaties,  notably 
between  Germany  and  Switzerland  and  Germany  and  Sweden  and  between 
the  Scandinavian  countries  themselves. 

(c)  To  the  Protocol  of  Geneva  of  last  year  Locarno  owes  much.  Its 
emphasis  on  security,  and  its  great  progress  towards  compulsory  arbitra¬ 
tion,  its  moral  fervor,  are  all  reminiscent  of  the  Fifth  Assembly’s  effort. 
But  Locarno  is  at  once  more  moderate  and  more  practical  than  the  too  am¬ 
bitious  and  idealistic  Protocol  proposals.  It  is  assured  of  a  much  larger 
measure  of  general  approval,  and  should  contribute  more  towards  European 
security  than  any  previous  effort  since  1919. 

Third,  they  strengthen  the  principles  of  judicial  settlement,  and  in  par¬ 
ticular  the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice,  as  follows: 

(a)  Both  in  the  security  treaty  and  in  the  four  arbitration  treaties 
Germany,  Belgium,  France,  Poland  and  Czechoslovakia  pledge  themselves 
to  refer  all  justiciable  questions  which  may  arise  between  them  to  arbitra¬ 
tion  or  to  the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice. 

(b)  In  the  case  of  Germany  and  her  western  neighbors  this  pledge  is 
not  merely  to  refer  such  cases  for  judicial  settlement,  but — and  this  is  very 
important — to  accept  in  advance  the  decisions  to  be  rendered. 

(c)  In  the  four  arbitration  treaties,  failing  an  agreement  between  the 
two  parties,  in  the  case  of  justiciable  questions,  any  one  party  may  sumhion 
the  other  party  before  the  Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice. 

Thus  in  these  three  ways,  Locarno  represents  strides  towards  the 
acceptance  of  compulsory  jurisdiction  of  the  Permanent  Court  of  Inter¬ 
national  Justice. 

Fourth,  the  treaties  center  in,  are  closely  integrated  with,  the  League 
of  Nations,  and  immeasurably  strengthen  the  League  system.  Why? 

(a)  Because  the  treaties  are  built  upon  the  entrance  of  Germany  into 
the  League.  Germany  in  the  League  will  end  the  charge  that  the  League 
has  been  merely  a  continuation,  in  a  veiled  form,  of  the  war-time  alliances. 
Turkey  and  Mexico  may  be  encouraged  now  to  enter  also,  leaving  outside 

15 


the  League  only  two  great  Powers — the  most  radical  and  the  most  con¬ 
servative.  [Applause.] 

But  the  entrance  of  Germany  into  the  League  will  do  more  than  en¬ 
courage  the  weak  and  the  timid.  [Laughter.]  (This  isn’t  a  partisan  dis¬ 
cussion  and  I  hope  you  won’t  read  into  my  words  any  meaning  I  did  not 
intend  them  to  contain.)  It  will  give  a  degree  of  reality  and  of  moral 
content  to  the  discussions  in  the  Council  and  the  Assembly  which  these  meet¬ 
ings  have  sometimes  not  had.  They  may  be  less  peaceful  than  before,  but 
they  will  be  much  more  real. 

(b)  The  Council  is  strengthened  in  other  ways  by  being  made  specific¬ 
ally  the  board  of  conciliation  of  last  resort  in  the  treaties;  the  special 
boards  of  conciliation  in  the  treaties  supplement  but  do  not  supplant  the 
Council’s  conciliatory  functions. 

(c)  Most  important  of  all,  as  far  as  the  League  is  concerned,  Locarno 
will  give  it  time.  Time  is  the  essence  of  the  League’s  needs.  A  genera¬ 
tion  of  peace  will  give  it  an  essential  opportunity  to  develop  its  latent  possi¬ 
bilities.  Locarno,  by  creating  what  the  signatories  called  a  “moral  relaxa¬ 
tion  of  the  tension  between  nations,”  promises  the  League  this  opportunity 
for  growth. 

Fifth,  Disarmament.  The  Final  Protocol  declares  that  one  of  the  pur¬ 
poses  of  Locarno  is  to  make  possible  the  carrying  out  of  Article  VIII  of 
the  Covenant,  the  ideal  of  general  disarmament.  Do  these  agreements  con¬ 
tribute  towards  that  end  ?  No  positive  answer  can  yet  be  given.  My  answer 
would  be  No  and  Yes — No,  not  immediately;  Yes,  once  the  treaties  become 
really  effective  and  after  Russia  has  somehow  been  brought  into  normal 
relations  with  her  neighbors.  But  even  before  better  relations  have  been 
established  with  Russia,  initial  steps  can  and  probably  will  be  taken.  But 
where?  Washington  or  Europe?  Not  in  Washington,  probably,  and  for 
these  reasons : 

(a)  France  is  unwilling.  Her  unwillingness  is  due  to  her  experiences 
at  the  Washington  Conference,  Caillaux’s  recent  experience  in  the  debt 
negotiations  at  Washington,  and  perhaps  even  more  than  either  of  these, 
the  undoubted  advantage  which  France  enjoys  in  a  conference  in  a 
European  atmosphere. 

(b)  But  even  were  France  willing,  the  nations  of  the  League  have 
committed  themselves  to  a  conference  under  the  League  auspices ;  the 
Council  was  authorized  at  the  last  Assembly  to  begin  preparatory  work, 
which  will  be  only  a  continuation  of  its  efforts  during  previous  years. 

(c)  Europe’s  general  tendency  is  to  look  away  from  the  United  States 
in  matters  of  this  sort.  Only  Germany,  and  to  a  much  less  degree  Great 
Britain,  might  for  special  reasons  prefer  a  conference  here. 

But  what  about  this  submarine  matter  ?  Lady  Astor  waked  up  the  other 
day  and  discovered  that  the  submarine  was  a  great  menace  to  the  peace 
of  the  world.  [Laughter.]  One  difficulty  with  the  British  propaganda  in 
favor  of  the  abolition  of  the  submarine  is  that  when  the  submarine  is  abol¬ 
ished  the  British  Navy,  relatively  speaking,  will  be  stronger  than  before. 
Of  course,  the  British,  being — like  Americans — highly  moral,  didn’t  empha¬ 
size  that  point  of  view  about  the  submarines.  [Applause.]  It  is  none  the 

16 


less  a  point  of  view  which  Frenchmen  remember,  and  which  the  small 
nations  of  Europe  cannot  forget.  Until  Britain  and  we,  the  dominant 
powers  on  the  sea,  are  willing  to  give  up  our  right  to  blockade  and  starve 
an  enemy  country  and  destroy  neutral  trade,  any  attempt  to  rob  the  weak 
countries  of  what  they  consider  to  be  a  means  of  self-defense  comes  with 
bad  grace  from  us.  [Laughter.]  Not  that  I  am  making  a  defense  of  the 
submarine ;  I  am  trying  merely  to  get  away  from  those  moralistic  sophistries 
which  sometimes  carry  us  off  our  feet. 

In  short,  Locarno,  because  it  grows  up  out  of  the  actual  situation  of 
today,  because  it  is  based  upon  previous  precedents  and  is  practical  and  lim¬ 
ited,  because  it  strengthens  the  principle  of  judicial  settlement  and  the 
Court,  because  it  vastly  strengthens  the  League  system  with  which  it  is 
tightly  integrated,  and  because  it  may  prepare  ultimately  for  disarmament, 
is  Europe’s  latest,  most  dramatic,  and  far-reaching  answer  to  the  charge 
that  she  cannot  live  at  peace.  It  marks  definitely  the  end  of  the  war  after 
the  war. 

But  we  are  very  apt,  at  a  moment  like  this,  to  forget  that  Locarno  has 
its  limitations.  We  are  apt  to  feel  that  the  whole  job  is  done.  As  a  matter 
of  fact,  Locarno  does  not  touch  at  all  many  of  the  most  vital  and  the  most 
critical  world  problems.  Russia  is  still  outside  the  picture.  Britain  is 
hearing  a  terrible  burden  of  economic  difficulties.  France  is  facing  fiscal 
problems  of  appalling  complexity;  she  is  enmeshed  in  Morocco  and  in 
Syria,  and  her  entanglements  there  are  serious  not  merely  for  France : 
they  are  symptomatic  of  the  failure  of  the  western  states  to  learn  how  they 
ought  to  deal  with  Africa  and  Asia.  [Applause.]  Many  of  France’s  diffi¬ 
culties  in  Africa  and  Syria  are  not  primarily  French  difficulties  at  all;  they 
are  difficulties  which  come  out  of  the  growing  racial  consciousness  of 
the  people  of  Africa  and  Asia,  a  growing  feeling  of  unity  against  what 
they  believe  to  be  the  abuses  of  the  western  and  so-called  Christian  world. 

| Applause.]  China  is  another  and  the  most  challenging  of  these  tests. 
Obviously  Locarno  does  not  deal  with  these  problems;  it  does  not  solve 
them;  it  leaves  them  where  they  were,  except  that  it  makes  possible  a 
greater  unity  of  Western  Europe  in  meeting  them. 

But  where  does  Locarno  leave  us?  Locarno  was  a  “domestic”  matter. 
Even  with  a  vast  stretch  of  the  imagination  we  can’t  claim  any  credit 
for  it,  official  or  otherwise  [laughter],  unless  perhaps  we  can  say  that 
being  a  rather  persistent  creditor  during  the  period  has  helped  along  the 
cause.  We  have  done  nothing  towards  Locarno.  Officially  we  did  little, 
unofficially  we  did  somewhat  more  in  reference  to  the  Dawes  Plan. 

What  are  our  opportunities?  The  Court  is  the  first  test.  Prompt 
adherence  on  the  basis  suggested  by  two  Republican  Presidents  and  two 
Republican  Secretaries  of  State  is  of  the  highest  importance — not  because 
such  action  in  itself  is  a  large  step,  but  precisely  for  the  reason  that  it 
would  be  a  small  step.  If  we  cannot  take  this  first  halting  step  we  must 
confess  ourselves  impotent  and  futile.  If  we  can’t  win  this  fight,  we 
can’t  win  any  fight.  Our  adherence  will  mean  little  to  the  Court,  and 
despite  the  President’s  statement  in  his  address  here  last  Thursday  night, 
our  adherence  will  mean  little  to  the  rest  of  the  world.  But  it  will  mean 
everything  to  us.  It  will  be  a  moral  victory,  strengthening  and  hearten¬ 
ing  us  for  the  next  and  much  greater  task. 

17 


A  night  or  two  ago,  Mr.  Root,  speaking  at  the  Pilgrim  dinner,  came 
very  near  saying  a  courageous  thing.  [Laughter.]  I  don’t  mean  to  say 
that  what  he  said  was  not  courageous,  but  he  came  very  near  saying  a 
still  more  courageous  thing.  He  said,  in  effect,  ‘‘The  world,  is  organized 

for  peace  through  the  League  of  Nations.  It  is  America’s  duty - ” 

and  for  a  minute  I  thought  he  was  going  to  say,  “It  is  America’s  duty 
to  enter  the  League,”. but  instead  he  said,  “It  is  America’s  duty  to  co¬ 
operate  with  the  community  of  nations.”  [Laughter.] 

It  is  not  enough  that  we  should  be  a  lenient  creditor ;  it  is  not  enough 
that  we  should  try  to  be  just  in  our  relations  with  other  states,  it  is 
not  enough  that  we  should  occasionally  co-operate  with  the  League  for 
limited  and  non-political  purposes.  I  he  world,  if  it  is  to  save  itself 
from  war,  must  so  organize  its  life,  so  habituate  all  people  to  peaceful 
means  of  settlement  of  international  disputes,  that  in  any  crisis  public 
opinion  will  demand  a  peaceful  solution  as  automatically  as  now,  when 
stirred  by  passion  and  anger,  it  automatically  demands  war. 

Personally,  but  not  as  Chairman  of  the  Executive  Board  of  the  For¬ 
eign  Policy  Association,  I  would  add  that  we  can  make  towards  this 
end  no  contribution  really  worthy  of  our  unique  strength,  our  unique 
wealth,  save  through  whole-hearted  co-operation  with,  and  at  the  earliest 
possible  moment  entrance  into,  the  League  of  Nations.  [Applause.] 


The  Chairman  :  Mr.  McDonald,  by  the  way,  points  out  that  he  still 
has  a  minute  and  a  half  to  spare.  I  congratulate  him.  [Laughter.] 

The  next  speaker  has  come  from  Washington  to  be  with  us  today 
and  I  feel  that  we  are  very  fortunate  to  have  secured  him.  He  served 
for  three  years  with  the  German  military  commission  in  Persia,  and  if 
any  of  you  have  seen  that  very  interesting  moving  picture  called  “Grass” 
you  will  be  interested  to  know  that  he  was  the  first  white  man  to  pene¬ 
trate  some  of  those  passes  in  Turkestan.  For  the  past  two  years  he  has 
been  a  member  of  the  staff  of  the  German-American  Mixed  Claims  Com¬ 
mission  in  Washington.  It  is  a  great  pleasure  to  introduce  Dr.  Paul  Lever- 
kuehn.  [Applause.] 


MADAM  CHAIRMAN,  ladies  and  gentlemen:  This  is  an  hour 
full  of  hopes  for  a  new  Europe.  If  anybody  has  a  right  to  look 
with  longing  eyes  into  the  future,  it  is  the  younger  generation, 
and  I  deem  it  a  great  privilege  if  you  will  let  me  add  to  the  expressions 
of  experienced  leaders  in  political  thought  a  few  words  from  an  unknown 
member  of  the  younger  generation  of  Germany. 

You  have  heard  the  eloquent  expression  of  the  views  of  France.  It 
is  well  to  remember  the  century-old  community  of  thought  between 
France  and  Germany;  moreover,  the  indebtedness  of  Germany  to  French 
art  and  literature,  the  comfort  derived  from  French  philosophy  by 
Prussia’s  greatest  king.  Voltaire’s  scepticism,  the  enthusiasm  for  free 
thought  and  the  liberation  of  the  human  mind,  have  always  found  a 
ready  echo  in  Germany’s  intellectual  life,  however  strong  may  have  been 
the  political  antagonism  during  300  years.  This  most  wonderful  mixture 

18 


of  scepticism  and  enthusiasm  in  the  French  mind  has  never  been  rever¬ 
berated  with  the  same  force  in  my  country :  criticism  and  pessimism 
have  been  the  more  pronounced  features  of  the  German  attitude  toward 
problems  of  a  high  order  and  significance. 

I.  think  this  difference  in  mental  attitude  should  be  remembered  if 
perhaps  in  these  days  you  should  be  led  to  believe  that  the  response  of 
Germany  appears  to  be  lacking  in  enthusiasm;  it  is  only  an  outside  ap¬ 
pearance;  the  dominant  underlying  factor  of  the  will  for  peace,  of  the 
longing  for  better  days,  is  only  too  strong  after  long  years  of  sufferings 
of  the  war — they  have  been  followed  by  the  agonies  of  a  period  of  infla¬ 
tion,  an  economic  breakdown  which  might  well  be  compared  to  a  general 
nervous  breakdown  of  a  whole  nation.  The  after-effects  of  a  nervous 
breakdown  have  not  quite  passed  away  yet,  and  the  general  attitude  of  a 
person  suffering  from  such  after-effects  is  to  a  certain  degree  still  sub¬ 
ject  to  instability  and  sensitiveness  to  irritation.  Let  not  these  passing 
conditions  obscure  the  reality  of  a  sincere  goodwill  and  practical  effort 
to  return  to  normal  and  more  than  that,  to  definite  stabilization  and  genuine 
peace. 

I  have  personally  no  doubt  that  the  Locarno  treaties  will  be  signed 
and  ratified  by  Germany.  They  are  approved  by  the  majority  of  the 
people  and  the  political  parties.  The  energy  of  Chancellor  Luther  and 
the  ability  of  Foreign  Minister  Stresemann  will  not  fail  to  carry  out 
what  they  suggested  and  agreed  upon  at  Locarno.  They  are  assisted  by 
the  President,  von  Hindenburg,  whose  popularity  assures  every  action 
backed  by  him  of  success.  And  here  I  desire  to  thank  Mr.  McDonald 
very  warmly  for  his  kind  words  about  President  von  Hindenburg. 

The  central  question  today  is  this :  what  is  the  understanding  and 
inherent  meaning  of  Locarno  from  the  standpoint  of  the  nations  who 
assembled  there,  and  for  me  to  outline :  what  is  it  that  Germany  considers 
as  particularly  significant  in  the  Locarno  agreement? 

When  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  was  signed,  it  was  over  the  unanimous 
protest  of  the  German  people,  who  did  not  believe  that  they  should  have 
been  excluded  from  all  deliberations  leading  to  that  treaty ;  they  have  never 
since  ceased  to  express  the  view  that  certain  provisions  of  the  treaty 
were  not  in  accord  with  the  armistice  and  with  the  very  idea  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  which  formed  the  first  part  of  the  treaty.  It  was 
the  desire  of  the  German  Government  now  to  come  to  a  peace  based 
on  an  agreement  which  led  to  the  suggestion  of  covenants  as  you  find 
them  a  result  of  Locarno.  Germany  has  solemnly  recognized  the  fron¬ 
tiers  with  Belgium  and  France;  that  means  she  has  abided  by  the  status  quo 
on  her  western  border. 

There  are  three  basic  problems  between  France  and  Germany  in  the 
Versailles  Treaty:  the  common  frontiers,  reparations,  and  the  security  of 
France.  These  three  problems  have  now  found  definite  solution :  the 
reparations  question  was  settled  by  the  Dawes  Plan ;  there  is  no  reason 
whatsoever  why  any  question  should  arise  that  could  not  be  settled  by 
arbitration ;  the  boundary  question  has  been  acquiesced  in,  and  the  ques¬ 
tion  of  the  security  of  Belgium  and  France  is  the  further  achievement 
of  Locarno.  The  system  of  guarantees  works,  furthermore,  both  ways, 
for  Germany  as  well  as  for  France.  The  disarmament  of  Germany  is 

19 


now  passing  out  of  discussion  on  Geiman  soil,  and  so  is  the  demilitariza 
tion  of  the  western  frontier.  It  would  considerably  add  to  international 
pacification  if  general  disarmament,  one  of  the  chief  aims  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  should  now  speedily  progress,  and  it  would  particularly  increase 
Germany’s  confidence  in  the  Locarno  agreements  if  the  system  of  de¬ 
militarized  zones  were  made  bi-lateral.  The  practical  situation  is  at  pres¬ 
ent  that  the  German  western  frontier  is  demilitarized  but  that  no  respec¬ 
tive  zone  has  as  yet  been  set  up  on  the  French  border. 

In  discussions  the  expression  is  frequently  used:  “demilitarization  of 
the  Rhineland.”  It  would  be  more  correct  to  say  “the  German  Rhine¬ 
land.”  For  the  French  army  stands  on  the  Rhine.  A  consistent  demili¬ 
tarization  on  both  sides  might  go  far  towards  creating  a  real  zone  of 
quiet  between  the  nations. 

That  the  League  is  conscious  of  the  necessity  of  treating  all  powers 
on  a  footing  of  equality  with  respect  to  such  zones  is  already  evidenced 
by  the  fact  that  the  first  draft  of  a  security  arrangement  fostered  by  the 
League  of  Nations  contains  a  passage  to  that  effect,  and  the  discussions 
of  disarmament  now  so  prevalent  all  over  the  world  might  advantageously 
take  this  question  into  consideration. 

The  result  of  Locarno  is  thus  that  all  basic  questions  directly  con¬ 
cerning  France  and  Germany  are  now  substantially  taken  out  of  the  range 
of  dispute.  This  being  achieved,  the  road  is  open  to  consideration  of 
other  questions  that  might  still  be  cause  of  unrest.  It  has  been  frequently 
asked  why  the  eastern  frontiers  of  Germany  could  not  be  treated  in  the 
same  way  as  her  western  boundaries.  The  answer  can  already  be  found 
in  the  way  in  which  they  were  treated  in  the  Versailles  Treaty:  while 
Alsace-Lorraine  was  immediately  turned  over  to  France,  the  question  of 
the  eastern  boundaries  was,  in  the  treaty,  in  many  respects  made  subject 
to  decision  by  the  inhabitants.  This  shows  that  there  was  even  then  felt 
to  be  an  amount  of  uncertainty  with  respect  to  national  claims  and  the 
will  of  the  people.  East  Prussia  has  decided  by  an  overwhelming 
majority  for  adherence  to  Germany,  while  Upper  Silesia  as  a  whole  car¬ 
ried  a  German  majority,  but  such  districts  as  had  the  more  considerable 
minority  of  non-German  votes  were  turned  over  to  Poland  by  the  de¬ 
cision  of  the  League  of  Nations.  It  is  further  interesting  to  note  that 
the  recent  elections  for  the  popular  assembly  of  the  district  of  Memel 
resulted  in  a  9-10  majority  of  the  population  for  adherence  to  Germany. 
This  district  as  well  as  other  territories  in  the  east  has  been  separated 
from  Germany  without  consulting  the  will  of  the  people. 

I  do  not  want  to  go  into  details  as  to  the  German  position  with  respect 
to  these  countries ;  I  do  not  want  to  quote  voices  in  this  country  support¬ 
ing  the  German  view-point.  But  I  think  I  am  absolutely  safe  in  con¬ 
tending  that  the  question  of  the  eastern  boundaries  from  the  very  outset 
showed  considerable  difficulties,  and  is  still,  to  say  the  least,  debatable. 
The  view-points  of  the  nations  have  not  yet  come  close  enough  together 
to  have  had  these  questions  discussed  at  Locarno ;  but  the  arbitration 
treaties  between  Germany  and  her  eastern  neighbors  are  manifestations 
of  the  will  on  both  sides  to  resort  to  arbitration  instead  of  war,  and  it 
may  be  hoped  that  the  same  courage  in  tackling  difficult  problems,  evi¬ 
denced  so  remarkably  at  Locarno,  when  applied  to  the  eastern  questions, 

20 


may  result  in  bringing  this  state  of  affairs  to  an  end  and  lead  to  a 
satisfactory,  permanent  solution. 

In  entering  into  the  agreements  of  Locarno,  Germany  asked  for  cer¬ 
tain  measures  with  respect  to  the  occupied  territory,  and  with  respect  to 
her  position  within  the  League,  which  would  manifest  the  new  position 
and  would  safeguard  her  from  being  turned  into  a  battlefield  of  other 
powers.  Quite  as  France  would  have  security  first  in  all  considerations 
so  Germany  is  bound  to  emphasize  this  point  for  herself.  Germany  is’ 
with  respect  to  boundaries,  most  unfortunately  placed:  the  German  army 
has  been  reduced  to  100,000  men;  ail  countries  surrounding  her  keep 
up  ai mies  that  aie  considerably  larger;  there  are  three  countries,  each 
of  which  have  far  larger  armies;  any  conflict  arising  in  any  part  of 
Europe  must  necessarily  affect  her,  if  not  in  the  military  sense,  then 
m  the  economic  sense,  as  provided  for  in  Article  XVI  of  the  Covenant 
of  the  League  of  Nations.  Germany  has  also  no  interest  in  any  present 
01  futuie  disputes  between  Lussia  and  her  neighbors  or  other  countries. 
1  he  collective  note  to  Germany,  which  is  an  inherent  part  of  the  Locarno 
undei  standing,  puipoits  to  take  care  of  the  exigencies  arising  out  of  the 
geographical  situation.  But  of  course  something  more  than  that  is  of 
vital  interest  to  Germany,  and  I  think  for  the  pacification  of  Europe  as 
a  whole,  and  that  is,  that  the  program  of  the  League  of  Nations  as 

well  as  of  the  United  States  with  respect  to  disarmament  be  carried 
into  effect. 

*  • 

!  d _ 

A  general  survey  of  the  results  of  Locarno  shows  a  definite  settle¬ 
ment  of  questions  of  the  past  and  an  open  road  to  the  future.  The 
European  situation  has  passed  out  of  a  stage  of  constant  open  disputes 
into  a  new  phase  which  is  in  many  respects  perhaps  not  so  much  to  be 
evaluated  with  a  view  to  the  immediate  results,  but  with  a  view  to  future 
developments. 

Speaking  in  the  broadest  sense,  Locarno  is  a  state  of  mind.  The 
question  is,  are  the  countries  concerned  really  willing  to  take  the  con¬ 
sequences  of  the  treaties  they  accept,  and  will  they  continue  in  this  state 
of  mind?  This  question,  asked  with  respect  to  Germany  can,  I  am 
com  meed,  be  answered  emphatically  in  the  affirmative.  In  saying  this 
I  am  not  just  following  my  own  sentiment;  I  am  not  relying  only  on 
indications  in  the  press  and  public  utterances  which  may  not  always  be 
dependable.  1  here  are  facts  which,  I  believe,  support  my  opinion  most 
distinctly.  dhese  facts  show  the  perfect  readiness  of  Germany  to 
answer  in  equal  merit  the  generous  policy  of  other  nations,  and  to  build 
up  international  understanding  and  co-operation,  not  only  in  politics,  but 
in  the  larger  field  of  intellectual  life. 

Let  me  give  you  an  example.  It  is  well  known  that  Germany  has  always 
resented  the  fact  that  all  decisions  for  carrying  out  the  Treaty  of  Versailles 
w^re  taken  by  the  Iveparation  Commission,  a  body  in  which  Germany  was 
not  represented.  The  United  States  could  have  chosen  to  enter  the  Repara¬ 
tion  Commission  or  to  set  up  a  similar  body  to  settle  the  American  war 
claims.  The  United  States,  however,  followed  her  tradition  of 
handling  international  disputes,  and  suggested  a  Mixed  Claims  Com¬ 
mission,  that  is,  a  commission  in  which  the  United  States  and  Germany 
were  equally  represented  by  a  national  commissioner,  while  questions 

21 


on  which  the  two  national  commissioners  could  not  agree  were  to  be 
submitted  to  an  umpire.  The  umpire  in  commissions  of  this  character 
is  generally  a  neutral,  appointed  by  agreement  of  the  two  governments, 
and  so  it  was  stipulated  between  the  two  countries.  But  Germany  was 
fully  aware  of  the  significance  of  the  fact  that  the  United  States  wanted 
all  disputes  settled  on  the  fair  basis  of  a  judicial  decision,  and  that 
the  United  States  would  have  been  fully  within  her  treaty  rights  had 
she  chosen  a  different  way.  The  generous  act  of  the  United  States 
was  answered  by  Germany  in  the  same  spirit  by  asking  the  President  of 
the  United  States  to  appoint  the  umpire,  an  unprecedented  event  in 
international  affairs. 

This  has  proved  to  be  a  most  satisfactory  basis.  I  may  perhaps 
assume  that  many  of  you  are  not  aware  that  for  three  years  there  has 
been  a  commission  in  existence  settling  all  disputes  arising  out  of  the 
war.  On  very  few  occasions  has  the  public  been  advised  at  all  of 
what  was  being  done  in  Washington  by  this  commission.  The  reason 
is  that  the  work  was  carried  on  under  the  auspices  of  a  generous 
understanding  between  the  two  countries,  and  never  was  any  complaint 
voiced.  But  the  work  was  done  in  silence,  and  it  has  been  done  speedily, 
in  remarkable  co-operation. 

Another  example  of  what  I  am  speaking  of.  When  the  Dawes  Plan  wias 
enacted  it  was  provided  that  on  all  commissions  and  bodies  called  into  life 
for  taking  care  of  the  various  activities  under  the  plan,  Germany  should  be 
represented.  Since  the  plan  went  into  effect  no  complaint  has  ever  been 
heard  about  lack  of  cooperation  or  about  dissatisfaction  of  any  party. 

What  I  want  to  say,  by  calling  your  attention  to  this,  is  that  Ger¬ 
many,  when  treated  as  an  equal  by  her  former  enemies,  has  not  failed 
to  recognize  the  inevitable  but  has  been  anxious  to  contribute  in  co¬ 
operation  to  solve  difficulties,  to  make  the  spirit  of  war  disappear,  and 
to  establish  conditions  of  peace. 

It  has  been  indicated  in  some  quarters  that  Locarno  might  be  a  new 
lining  up  of  the  Powers.  It  is  to  be  regretted  if  suspicions  of  such 
nature  should  draw  a  shadow  across  the  proper  outlook  opened  by 
Locarno.  They  are,  first  of  all,  naturally  premature.  What  has  been 
accomplished  is  that  Germany  and  France  are  now  arriving  at  the  basis 
that  was  already  reached  between  the  United  States  and  Germany  three 
years  ago,  when  the  two  nations  arrived  at  the  conclusion  to  wind  up 
the  war  business  on  the  basis  of  co-operation  instead  of  command  and 
obedience.  It  was  two  years  ago  that  a  treaty  of  friendship  and  com¬ 
merce  was  signed  between  the  United  States  and  Germany,  which  has 
since  been  ratified  by  both  countries.  So  far  the  present  status  as  exist¬ 
ing  between  the  United  States  and  Germany  is  still  but  an  aim  as 
between  France  and  Germany. 

I  need  hardly  mention  that  a  treaty  of  friendship  and  commerce 
between  France  and  Germany  is  a  consummation  devoutly  to  be  wished, 
and  the  economic  and  geographic  position  of  the  European  Powers  does, 
of  course,  call  for  a  much  closer  economic  alliance. 

So  much  about  Germany’s  state  of  mind  in  the  political  field.  In 
the  exchange  of  intellectual  and  spiritual  matters  between  European 

22 


countries,  so  fruitful  for  centuries,  she  is  ready  to  redouble  the  efforts 
already  so  well  on  the  way  in  this  field,  in  which  not  only  the  govern¬ 
ments  and  leaders  take  action,  but  where  every  individual  has  to  make 
his  contribution  and  can  make  his  contribution. 

E ^  cn  in  1922,  students  of  the  Ijmversity  of  Cambridge  collected 
more  than  £2,000  to  assist  their  impoverished  fellow-students  in  Central 
Europe.  This  was  one  group  of  a  nation  assisting  its  comrades  in  a 
former  enemy  country.  1  here  has  since  grown  up  a  thorough  under¬ 
standing  between  the  younger  generations  of  many  countries,  one  of  the 
unmistakable  signs  of  the  desire  for  understanding  and  peace. 

As  between  France  and  Germany,  I  need  hardly  say  anything,  since 
the  splendid  work  of  reconciliation  carried  on  by  Mile.  Weiss  and  her 
associates  has  been  so  eloquently  praised.  It  is  sure  to  find  a  resonance 
everywhere,  much  more  pronounced  since  Locarno. 

I  do  not  want  to  over-estimate  the  importance  of  the  younger  gen¬ 
eration,  but  1  am  sure  you  will  forgive  me  for  mentioning  their  efforts 
to  indicate^  the  state  of  mind  of  the  younger  generation  all  over  the 
world.  1  hey  are  not  often  brought  to  public  attention,  but  they  are 
theie,  to  come  to  light,  and  come  to  full  effect,  in  later  days,  a  strong 
under-current  in  the  stream  of  world  development  on  which  now  the 
ship  of  Locarno  is  setting  sail. 

I  have  spoken  at  the  outset  of  the  pessimistic  trend  in  the  German 
mind.  I  do  not  want  to  say  any  more  than  I  can  conscientiously 
say;  I  do  not  want  to  say  anything  that,  in  the  enthusiasm  over  the 
accomplishment  of  today,  might  later  on  lead  to  disappointment,  misinter- 
pietation,  or  distrust.  But  neither  scepticism  nor  pessimism  can  obscure 
the  fact  of  the  necessity  of  peace,  of  the  desire  for  peace,  of  the  will 
for  peace.  [Applause.] 


1  he  Chairman:  Ihe  meeting  is  open  now  for  the  usual  period  of 
questions  and  discussion  from  the  floor.  In  order  to  give  opportunities 
to  as  many  as  possible,  we  insist  that  the  discussion  must  be  brief  and  we 
prefer,  if  I  may  borrow  a  phrase,  that  it  should  be  brilliant. 

Mr.  F.  A.  Colt:  May  I  ask  Mile.  Weiss  what  influence,  if  any,  in 
her  opinion  has  so  profoundly  apparently  changed,  or  did  change,  the 
attitude  of  France  in  the  latter  part  of  the  Locarno  Conference? 

The  Chairman  :  Mr.  Colt  is  asking  Mile.  Weiss  what  potent  in¬ 
fluence  changed  the  attitude  of  France  in  the  latter  days  of  the  Locarno 
Conference.  She  does  not  know  that  there  was  any  change. 

Mr.  Colt  :  Then  my  premises  are  not  well  founded. 

Ihe  Chairman:  The  next  question? 

Mr.  Kohler  :  I  would  like  to  say  that  while  Mr.  McDonald  was 
speaking  and  so  forcibly  referring  to  the  fact  that  the  Locarno  Treaties 
really  as  between  those  countries  are  a  cause  of  outlawing  war,  I  was  re¬ 
minded  of  the  fact  that  long  before  the  Great  War  began,  both  Andrew 

23 


D.  White  and  David  J.  Hill  condemned  Germany  in  connection  with  the 
Hague  Conference  for  having  avowedly  declined  to  join  in  any  plan  for 
absolute  international  arbitration,  Count  Muenster  even  saying  it  would 
be  foolish  for  Germany  to  give  up  the  advantages  of  her  military  pre¬ 
paredness  by  agreeing  to  arbitrate  while  possibly  other  countries  would 
be  getting  ready  to  tight.  1  was  also  recently  reading  some  of  Roose¬ 
velt's  letters  and  was  struck  by  the  fact  that  in  connection  with  these 
Hague  Conferences  he  records  the  circumstance  that  Russia,  which  called 
the  Hague  Conferences,  was  secretly  at  those  conferences  declining  to 
join  in  any  workable  plan  for  international  arbitration,  and  Roosevelt 
himself  says  in  his  letters  to  Lodge  that  he  cannot  join  and  approve  of 
any  compulsory  international  arbitration  agreement  that  did  not  have 
express  and  important  reservations  and  exceptions. 

Now,  to  get  down  to  my  question :  I  want  to  ask  whether,  in  line 
with  that,  during  the  last  few  months,  either  at  Locarno  or  on  the  part 
of  publicists  or  statesmen  of  the  countries  represented  there,  any  have 
publicly,  in  print  or  verbally,  taken  that  same  position ;  that  is,  that  they 
are  so  powerful  now  as  compared  relatively  to  their  rivals,  disarmed  or 
partly  disarmed,  that  it  would  be  foolish  for  them  to  join  in  any  agree¬ 
ment  for  compulsory  arbitration  without  exception  and  reservation. 

The  Chairman:  Mr.  McDonald  is  ready  to  answer  that  question. 
[Laughter.] 

Mr.  McDonald  :  The  answer  to  the  question,  as  far  as  Europe  is 
concerned,  would,  I  think,  be  in  the  negative.  I  am  sorry,  however,  to 
have  to  add  that  the  United  States — while  it  has  not  made  any  general 
statement  to  the  effect  that  it  is  so  strong  that  it  does  not  need  to  make 
a  general  treaty  of  arbitration  with  anybody,  it  did,  the  other  day,  make 
a  treaty — I  think  it  was  with  Sweden — to  arbitrate  all  questions  except 
those  of  “vital  interests  and  national  honor.”  It  makes  me  feel  a  little 
ashamed  to  think  of  our  country  in  1924  and  1925  being  the  great  out¬ 
standing  proponent  of  this  outworn  and  mediaeval  exception,  “vital 
interests  and  national  honor.”  [Applause.] 

One  of  the  great  things  about  the  League  and  one  of  the  great  things 
about  Locarno  is  that  there  are  no  exceptions  such  as  vital  interests  and 
national  honor,  and  as  far  as  those  states  are  concerned  those  phrases 
have  gone  into  the  discard.  It  would  seem  to  me  that  we,  at  any  rate 
in  treaties  with  such  dangerous  neighbors  as  Sweden,  might  let  them 
go  into  the  discard  also.  [Applause.] 

Mrs.  Emmons  Blaine:  I  figure  that  questions  look  to  the  future 
and  not  to  the  past.  I  would  like  to  ask  the  German  spokesman  if, 
when  Germany  enters  the  League  of  Nations,  Germany  would  offer  up 
prayer  with  the  other  nations  that  we  too,  the  United  States,  would 
catch  the  light  that  is  being  shed  in  Geneva,  which  Geneva,  perhaps,  and 
Europe  first  caught  from  some  of  us — that  we  may  catch  it  again  and 
receive  inspiration  from  Germany’s  doing  likewise? 

Dr.  Leverkuei-in:  Anything  that  Germany  can  do  to  better  the  con¬ 
ditions  between  the  United  States  and  Germany  will  certainly  be  done, 
and  that  Germany  is  anxious  to  have  the  United  States  in  the  League 
of  Nations,  I  think,  is  absolutely  obvious. 

24 


Mr.  Brent  Allinson  :  May  I  ask  Mr.  McDonald  whether  he  would 
think  it  fair  to  regard  the  Locarno  Conference  as  in  some  sense  caused 
or  explained  by  the  desire  of  the  Allies  to  purchase  the  admission  of 
Germany  to  the  League,  and  whether  a  result  of  the  Locarno  Confer¬ 
ence  will  be  in  effect  the  opening  of  a  way  to  the  abrogation  of  parts 
of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles? 

Mr.  McDonald:  As  to  the  first  part  of  the  question — whether  the 
concessions  in  the  Treaties  of  Locarno  are  the  price  of  Germany’s  entrance 
into  the  League — I  don’t  know.  The  two  things  happened  at  the  same 
time  and  are  closely  related.  France  has  taken  the  position  for  many 
months  that  Germany  must  come  into  the  League  as  a  part  of  any  thor¬ 
ough-going  plan  for  security.  I  think,  roughly  speaking,  it  would  only 
be  fair  to  say  that  Germany  has  hesitated  for  reasons  of  her  own  to  enter 
the  League,  and  then  the  Allies  at  Locarno  offered  certain  concessions  to 
bring  her  in. 

As  to  the  second  question — whether  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  may  now 
be  modified  through  the  machinery  of  the  League— Mr.  Allinson  knows 
as  much  about  that  as  I  do ;  nobody  really  knows  about  it.  The  machin¬ 
ery  for  modification  under  the  terms  of  the  League  is  defined  in  Article 
XIX  of  the  Covenant,  which  provides  that  treaties  may  he  reconsidered 
which  have  ceased  to  fit  conditions.  But  the  Treaty  of  Versailles  is  not 
being  modified  by  formal  arrangement.  It  is  not  being  modified  as 
some  of  us  used  to  say  it  ought  to  be  and  as  many  of  my  radical  friends 
continue  to  say  it  ought  to  be  modified,  by  formal  edict  and  decree.  The 
Dawes  Pian  is  an  enormous  modification  of  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 
Locarno  in  itself  is  a  modification  of  that  Treaty.  My  guess  is  that  in 
the  future,  if  this  state  of  mind  which  we  call  Locarno  continues  or 
improves,  we  shall  have  many  additional  and  fundamental  modifications — 
many  of  them  without  knowing  that  the  thing  is  happening  at  all. 
[Applause.] 

Mrs.  H.  H.  Moorhead:  Following  that  remark  of  Mr.  McDonald, 
may  I  ask  Mile.  Weiss  if  she  believes  that  the  “state  of  mind  called 
Locarno”  will  seriously  modify  the  working  of  the  Dawes  Plan? 

Mlle.  Weiss:  I  think  that  the  state  of  mind  called  Locarno  can 
modify  the  Dawes  Plan,  but  only  in  the  way  of  closer  understanding 
between  France  and  Germany.  [Applause.] 

The  Chairman  :  I  am  surprised  that  nobody  here  has  been  as  curious 
about  the  Locarno  Treaties  as  some  of  the  members  of  the  British  Par¬ 
liament,  who  recently  asked  some  very  searching  questions. 

Mr.  Albert  Muldavin  :  I  should  like  to  know  how  they  would  en¬ 
force  the  Locarno  Treaty  in  case  one  of  the  parties  should  break  away 
from  it? 

Mr.  McDonald:  Of  course  you  have  to  discriminate  between  trea¬ 
ties,  but  the  sanction  provisions  of  the  Treaty  are  set  forth  in  great  detail 
in  Article  IV  of  the  Western  Treaty.  The  substance  of  it  is  this: 
In  the  West  there  is  a  definite  test  of  aggression.  That  test  of  aggression 
is  the  violation  of  the  demilitarized  zone  either  by  France  or  Germany  or 
Belgium,  in  which  case  the  other  parties  have  the  right  to  resist,  and 

25 


Britain  and  Italy  must  join  them.  That  is  one  test.  The  second  test  is  a 
violation  of  other  provisions  in  the  Treaty,  in  which  case  the  matter  will 
be  referred  to  the  Council  of  the  League.  The  whole  business  is  extremely 
complicated  and  technical  but  there  has  been  a  serious  attempt  to  devise  a 
system  of  sanctions  and  tests  based  largely  on  the  example  of  the  Pro¬ 
tocol  last  year  which  would,  as  they  say,  tighten  the  gaps  in  the  Covenant 
and  really  make  the  sanctions  effective.* 

The  Chairman:  We  will  have  questions  and  discussion  from  the 
speakers’  table  now,  just  to  give  a  little  variety.  We  will  hear  from 
Canon  Ernest  Dimnet,  who  was  the  French  spokesman  at  the  Williams- 
town  Conference  two  years  ago  and  afterwards  delivered  the  Lowell  lec¬ 
tures  at  Harvard. 

Abbe  Dimnet:  What  I  am  about  to  say  is  not  to  ask  a  question 
but  to  propound  a  doubt :  why  is  it  that  the  Locarno  agreement  seemed 
to  be  such  a  surprise  in  America?  I  was  positively  amazed  on  land¬ 
ing,  three  weeks  ago,  to  discover  a  sort  of  bland  surprise  accompanied 
by  the  usual  doubt  when  you  hear  that  Europe  is  going  to  be  at  peace; 
but  this  time  it  does  seem  to  be  serious. 

The  other  point  may  be  correlated  with  the  first,  but  I  think  it  is  a 
useful  thing  to  bring  out — the  extraordinary  boost  which  I  find  in  Re¬ 
publican  circles  that  the  Locarno  agreement  has  given  to  the  League  of 
Nations.  I  see  a  great  many  Republicans  in  this  town  and  generally 
in  America.  I  used  to  ask  them  repeatedly  the  question,  “Why  is  it 
that  this  World  Court,  which  was  your  platform  in  the  election  of  Presi¬ 
dent  Harding,  is  never  referred  to?”  And  now,  at  last,  here  is  this 
agitation  in  America  for  the  World  Court,  in  Mrs.  Mead’s  proposal  in 
Detroit,  President  Hibben’s  Convention  next  December,  and  finally  the 
words  of  President  Coolidge  which  I  devoured  yesterday  in  the  Times. 

But  it  seems  to  me  that  it  is  almost  a  pity  at  the  present  moment 
that  this  World  Court  question  is  being  mooted.  What  is  the  World 
Court,  after  all,  viewed  as  it  is  here?  Strictly  and  entirely  an  effort  to 
prevent  war?  Certainly  we  are  farther  away  from  war  than  we  have 
been  for  years,  and  everybody  feels  that.  There  is  a  tremendous  differ¬ 
ence  between  the  spirit  of  Locarno,  the  Locarno  state  of  mind,  and  the 
previous  condition.  I  feel  it  in  myself.  Then  somebody  comes  with 
an  insistence  on  the  World  Court  just  when  it  seems  to  me  that  the  League 
of  Nations  ought  to  be  entirely  monopolizing  attention.  [Applause.] 
It  seems  to  me  that  Americans  have  never  quite  realized  the  extraordinary 
difference  between  the  League  of  Nations  as  just  a  mere  expedient  or 
stratagem  to  stave  war  off,  and  what  it  really  is.  It  is  something  much 
larger.  The  Americans  who  visit  Geneva  see  that  it  is  something  like 
a  world  bureau  in  which  the  affairs  of  the  world  are  transacted — affairs 
of  all  kinds,  even  statistics.  You  can  get  information  free  in  Geneva 
on  any  question — the  labor  question,  the  opium  question,  *the  white  slave 
question — and  in  a  few  months  probably  the  most  important  economic 
conference  called  by  the  League,  which  may  result  in  the  United  States 
of  Europe,  in  the  sense  that  your  United  States  were  not  formed  until 
1787  by  economic  unity.  This  is,  I  think,  the  real  important  point  on 
which  stress  ought  to  be  laid.  [Applause.] 

*  For  an  elaboration  of  these  points,  see  supra,  p.  11. 

26 


The  Chairman:  Since  no  one  else  volunteers,  I  shall  venture  to 
answer  Abbe  Dimnet’s  question  as  to  why  some  were  surprised  about  the 
Locarno  Treaties.  I  believe  the  surprise — if  there  is  surprise — arose  from 
the  disillusionment  and  disappointment  which  many  have  felt  since  1918, 
which  made  many  determined  not  to  hope  for  too  much. 

Do  I  hear  any  further  questions  from  the  floor?  If  not,  I  am  going 
to  call  for  a  few  moments  on  Mr.  Chester  Rowell  of  California,  former 
editor  and  publisher  of  the  Fresno  Republican.  Perhaps  some  of  the 
very  fortunate  ones  among  you  have  read  Mr.  Rowell’s  debate  with  Sen¬ 
ator  Borah  on  the  World  Court,  which  I  consider  the  most  brilliant  an¬ 
alysis  of  the  World  Court  I  have  yet  read.  Mr.  Chester  Rowell. 
[Applause.] 

Mr.  Chester  Rowell  :  The  time  is  too  short  for  me  to  say  much, 
and  it  would  be  impossible  for  me  to  add  much  to  what  has  already  been 
said  beyond  a  few  generalities. 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  war  did  not  end  on  Armistice  Day,  1918 — 
only  the  shooting  part  of  the  war  ended  then;  and  for  the  rest,  if  there 
was  an  Armistice  Day,  it  was  at  the  signing  of  the  Treaty  of  Locarno 
on  October  16th,  or  its  ratification  on  next  December.  Now  at  last, 
for  the  first  time  the  war  is  over.  I  think  we  may  add  one  more  thing, 
and  that  is  that  Locarno  is  one  of  the  vital  steps  in  the  evolution  of 
the  League  of  Nations,  and  that  America  is  more  interested  than  any 
other  country  in  the  subsequent  steps  of  that  evolution.  We,  a  lawyer- 
ridden  country,  are  inclined  to  think  of  everything  as  a  document,  and 
we  analyze  that  document.  The  League  of  Nations  is  not  a  document; 
it  is  an  institution,  and  it  grows.  The  Locarno  Treaty  is  a  regional 
agreement ;  it  is  one  step  in  an  evolution  whose  goal  we  do  not  yet  know, 
but  there  is  danger  that  America  will  hope  that  the  goal  will  be  an  iso¬ 
lated  United  States  of  Europe.  If  that  goal  were  reached,  then  there 
would  be  another  isolated  Monroe  Doctrine  for  the  two  Americas.  Europe 
could  live  on  that  basis  and  America  could  live  on  that  basis ;  but  there 
is  still  Asia,  and  we  who  live  face  to  face  with  Asia  recognize  how  im¬ 
portant  to  America  Asia  is.  If  we  were  to  misuse  this  evolution  so 
that  the  League  of  Nations  should  produce  a  United  States  of  Europe 
and  a  Monroe  Doctrine  of  America,  we  could  not  say  “No”  to  the  same 
thing  happening  in  Asia.  Then  there  would  be  three  Leagues  in  the 
world,  and  the  situation  in  Europe,  which  made  war  inevitable,  would 
merely  have  been  expanded  to  a  world  scale.  [Applause.]  Therefore, 
the  United  States  may  shut  its  eyes  to  Europe  all  it  likes,  but  it  has 
never  shut  its  eyes  to  Asia;  it  does  not  dare  to  shut  its  eyes  to  Asia; 
and  the  only  way  to  keep  from  isolating  the  United  States  and  Asia 
destructively  is  to  expand  the  world  League  constructively  so  that  it  may 
be,  if  necessary,  a  federation  of  regional  agreements,  but  that  they  shall 
not  be  isolated  and  the  world  League  shall  be  really  a  world  League. 
Otherwise,  America’s  isolation  will  mean  disaster  when  America  begins 
to  get  the  consequences  of  Asia’s  isolation.  [Applause.] 

The  Chairman  :  It  is  too  bad  Mr.  Rowell  could  not  have  been  at  our 
last  meeting  to  hear  the  discussion  on  the  United  States  of  Europe. 

Mr.  Antonoff:  I  would  like  to  ask  Mile.  Weiss  a  question — if 
there  is  a  moral  spirit  in  the  Locarno  Conference  since  the  French  intel- 

27 


lectuals  led  the  French  people  to  believe  that  Germany  has  accepted  at 
Locarno  conditions  imposed  upon  them  by  France?  This  opinion  held 
by  the  French  is  bitterly  felt  in  Germany. 

Mlle.  Weiss  :  I  should  like  to  know  to  what  Mr.  Antonofif  refers. 

Mr.  Antonoff:I  refer  to  the  editorial  in  the  last  issue  of  your 
paper  in  which  is  printed  the  Locarno  Treaty.  In  this  you  say:  “ L’Alle - 
magne  accepte  de  bon  grc  ce  qui  avait  ete  impose” 

Mlle.  Weiss:  I  am  sorry  to  have  to  confess  that  I  have  not  had 
a  chance  to  read  my  own  paper  since  I  left  Paris.  I  think  that 
it  is  always  very  difficult  to  cut  two  or  three  sentences  from  an 
article  and  understand  the  meaning  of  the  article  by  those  chosen  sen¬ 
tences.  [Applause.]  I  believe  that  my  contributor  thought  in  this  edi¬ 
torial  that  he  was  obliged  to  state  this :  that  Germany  had,  during  those 
seven  years,  understood  that  France  would  not  abandon  here  her  fight 
for  security  and  had  realized  that  France  would  not  be  restful  if  this 
security  was  not  attained.  So  the  author  states  that  we  made  security 
the  point  of  our  policy  and  the  policy  of  our  friends,  and  shows  thus 
that  Germany,  having  understood  that  this  was  a  condition  of  France’s 
life  from  the  French  point  of  view,  understood  also  that  it  was  a  con¬ 
dition  of  Germany’s  life  to  see  that  she  would  have  a  right  to  arbitra¬ 

tion.  After  all,  Germany  in  Locarno  was  compelled  to  understand  our 
point  of  view.  But  I  believe  the  Locarno  agreement  meant  a  sacrifice  for 
us  as  it  meant  a  sacrifice  for  Germany ;  there  are  things  to  be  accepted 
by  us  in  the  Locarno  agreement  that  we  don’t  so  very  much  like  as 
there  are  things  in  the  Locarno  agreement  that  Germany  doesn’t  so  very 
much  like.  Well,  we  have  to  play  the  game  of  our  public  opinion  and 
show  that  if  Germany  was  compelled  to  do  some  things,  which  is  always 
a  feeling  of  victory  for  us,  on  the  other  hand,  on  the  other  side  of  the 
line,  the  Germans  can  say  that  we  were  compelled  to  do  some  other 

things.  That  is  precisely  why  we  have  this  excitement  in  the  press 

which  I  was  referring  to  when  I  was  speaking  of  the  Yale-Harvard 
game.  The  leaders  in  Germany  and  in  France  were  strong  enough  to 
fight  that  excitement,  but  as  the  treaties  have  not  yet  been  ratified  by 
our  Parliament  we  have  to  make  it  easy  for  them — don’t  you  see — as 
they  have  to  make  it  easy  on  the  other  side.  [Applause.]  So  that  I 
think  the  question  of  Mr.  Antonofif  only  gave  me  the  occasion  to  show 
that  our  press  and  the  press  of  Germany  had  to  make  us  swallow  our 
sacrifices.  We  had  been  fed  with  hatred,  fed  with  armament,  fed  with 
the  idea  of  fight.  Finally  those  things  have  come  to  an  end  for  the 
victory  of  every  one.  [Applause.] 

Mr.  Arthur  Reese:  Mav  I  have  four  or  five  minutes? 

m/ 

The  Chairman:  It  is  already  time  for  adjournment,  but  we  should 
be  glad  to  have  your  question  if  you  can  put  it  in  one  minute. 

Mr.  Arthur  Reese:  I  want  to  instill  a  note  of  cynicism.  I  approve 
of  the  Locarno  Pacts  and  I  would  like  to  support  the  World  Court  and  the 
League  of  Nations,  but  it  does  seem  to  me  that  there  are  four  exceptions 
to  these  Locarno  Treaties  wherein  they  can  be  the  sole  judge  without  inter¬ 
national  authority.  If  you  will  notice  in  the  sixth  article  of  the  Treaty, 

28 


France  still  has  the  same  rights  and  obligations  as  she  had  under  the  Treaty 
of  Versailles.  She  can  come  in  again  as  she  did  in  the  Ruhr  two  or  three 
years  ago. 

The  white  Allies  have  the  mastery  of  the  world;  they  will  not  give 
it  up,  and  as  long  as  that  white  mastery  is  supreme,  they  will  make  all 
kinds  of  agreements  and  will  not  allow  anything  to  come  before  the  World 
Court  or  the  League  of  Nations  within  the  period  of  their  white  mastery. 
1  here  is  no  use  in  thinking  that  anything  is  going  to  be  done  in  the 
future  to  surrender  voluntarily,  on  the  part  of  the  white  Allies,  the  dom¬ 
inating  supremacy  of  their  position. 

The  Chairman:  I’m  sorry  but  your  time  is  up,  Mr.  Reese.  Mile. 
Weiss  wants  to  answer  the  first  part  of  your  question. 

Mlle.  Weiss:  I  want  to  answer  it  very  briefly.  I  regret  that  this 
gentleman,  Mr.  Reese,  seems  not  to  have  benefitted  by  the  explanations 
I  gave,  Mr.  McDonald  gave,  and  Mr.  Leverkuehn  gave,  because  in  fact 
if  the  Locarno  agreements  are  signed  we  cannot — we  French  cannot — 
enter  the  Ruhr  any  more.  [Applause.] 


[The  Meeting  Adjourned  at  4  o’clock.] 


The  texts  of  the  Locarno  Treaties 
may  be  obtained  from  the  World 
Peace  Foundation ,  40  M t.  Vernon 
Street ,  Boston ,  Mass . 

price  5  CENTS 


4 


29 


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